Buttonwood: Out of Touch
梧桐：失去关联
How intangible assets are changing investment
无形资产如何改变投资
When you work as an equity analyst at an investment bank, your task is clear. It is to comb all the statements made by corporate executives, to scour the industry trends and arrive at an accurate forecast of the company’s profits. Achieve this and your clients will be happy and your bonus cheque will have many digits.
如果你在一家投资银行担任股票分析师，那你的任务很明确：梳理企业管理层给出的各种财务报告，追踪行业发展趋势，最终准确预测出企业的利润水平。能做到这一点，你的客户就会满意，你的奖金支票上也将有一长串数字。
But is all this effort worthwhile? Not as much as it used to be, according to Feng Gu and Baruch Lev, writing in a recent issue of Financial Analysts Journal1. The authors imagined that investors could perfectly forecast the next quarter’s earnings for all companies. They then assumed that investors bought all the stocks that they expected to meet or beat the consensus of analysts’ forecasts; and that investors could short (ie, bet on a declining price) the stocks of those that were predicted not to reach their estimates. They made their investment two months before the end of a quarterly reporting period and got out of their positions one month after the quarter ended (by which time the earnings have been reported).
但是花这些功夫值得吗？不像过去那么值得了，顾峰（Feng Gu，音译）和巴鲁·列弗（Baruch Lev）在最近一期《金融分析师期刊》（Financial Analysts Journal）上发表文章指出。两位作者假想投资者可以准确预测出所有公司下一季度的收益，然后假设他们购买了所有那些他们认为能达到或超出分析师普遍预期的股票，而且可能会卖空（即赌股价会跌）那些他们认为达不到分析师预期的股票。投资者在季度业绩报告期结束前两个月投入资金，在季度结束后一个月（那时收益已经公布）平仓。
In the late 1980s and 1990s, this would have been a highly successful strategy, achieving excess returns (over those achieved by stocks of similar size) of 4% or more every quarter. But these abnormal returns have dropped: in recent years they have been only 2% a quarter. A similar effect appeared when examining the returns that would have been achieved by perfectly predicting those companies that achieved annual earnings growth.
换在20世纪80年代末和90年代，这会是个非常成功的策略，每季度可获得4%或以上的超额收益（超过类似规模的股票的收益）。但是这一超额收益率已经下降了：近几年来每个季度只有2%。研究发现，通过准确预测出实现年度收益增长的企业而得到的回报也有类似的变化。
Although an excess return of 2% a quarter would still be highly attractive, it would require a perfect forecasting record. That suggests the number-crunching performed by fallible analysts and investors produces much lower returns.
虽然每季度2%的超额收益率仍然非常有吸引力，但这需要预测一贯准确。也就是说，容易犯错的分析师和投资者们在一番算计后得到的回报要低得多。
The intriguing question is why those returns have been falling. The authors argue that the decline is because of the rising importance of intangible investments in recent decades (in areas such as software or trademark development). Such investment may be a big driver of value growth.
有趣的问题是为什么超额收益率一直在下降。两位作者认为是由于近几十年无形资产投资（例如在软件或品牌发展等领域）的重要性日益上升。这种投资可能是价值增长的重要推动力。
Accountants have struggled to adapt. If a company buys an intangible asset, such as a patent, from another business, it is classed as an asset on the balance-sheet. But if they develop an intangible within the business, that is classed as an expense, and thus deducted from profits. As the authors note: “A company pursuing an innovation strategy based on acquisitions will appear more profitable and asset-rich than a similar enterprise developing its innovations internally.”
会计师们一直未能做出相应的调整。如果一个企业从另一个企业购买了某种无形资产，例如一项专利，这在资产负债表上会被归入资产。但如果这个企业自己开发了一项无形资产，则会把它归为支出，因而要从利润中扣除。正如作者指出的那样：“相比依靠内部创新的企业，通过收购实现创新战略的企业看起来利润水平更高，资产也更雄厚。”
As a result, the authors argue, reported earnings are no longer such a good measure of a company’s profits, and thus may not be a useful guide to future share performance. To test this proposition, they divided companies into five quintiles based on their intangible investment. Sure enough, the more companies spent on intangibles, the lower the excess return available to those who correctly forecast the earnings.
由此，作者认为，在衡量一家公司的利润时，企业对外公布的收益水平不再是那么可靠的指标，因而在预测未来的股票表现时可能也不再是一个有用的参考。为了检验这个观点，他们根据无形资产投资的规模将企业分成五档。果然，如他们所料，企业在无形资产上的投入越多，那些准确预测出公司收益的投资者能实现的超额收益率就越低。
The paper’s message echoes the themes of a new book2 by Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake, which explores the impact of the growing importance of intangible assets in modern economies. The book finds a link between the poor productivity record of many leading economies since the crisis of 2008, and the sluggish rate of investment in intangible assets since then.
这篇论文的观点与乔纳森·哈斯克尔（Jonathan Haskel）和斯蒂安·韦斯特莱克（Stian Westlake）合著的一本新书主题不谋而合。那本书探讨了在现代经济体中无形资产的重要性日益增长所带来的影响。2008年金融危机以来，许多发达经济体生产率增长缓慢，而无形资产投资率增长疲软，该书发现二者存在关联。
The problem is that intangibles have spillovers. A company may undertake expensive research and development, but the gains may be realised by other businesses. Only a few companies (the likes of Google) can achieve the scale needed to take reliable advantage of their intangible investments. Unlike machines and equipment, intangibles may have limited resale value. So the risks of failure may put businesses off intangible investment.
无形资产有溢出效应，这是问题所在。虽然一家企业可能会将大量资金投入研发，但收益却可能被其他企业攫取。只有少数像谷歌这样的公司能达到相当的规模，从而利用无形资产投资获得切实的回报。无形资产与机器及设备不同，其转售价值可能有限。因此，失败的风险可能会让企业对无形资产投资望而却步。
This is both good news and bad news for investors. On the one hand, it may explain why profits have remained high relative to GDP. In theory, high returns should have attracted a lot more investment and the resulting competition should have driven down profits. But the difficulty in exploiting intangibles may have prevented that. On the other hand, the reluctance of many businesses to invest in intangibles may restrict their scope for growth in future. Investors looking for growth stocks will face a restricted choice and such companies will be so apparent to everyone that they will command a very high valuation. Not so much the “nifty fifty” stocks that were fashionable in the early 1970s, as the nifty five or six.
这对投资者来说既是好消息也是坏消息。一方面这可以解释为什么利润占GDP的比例如此之高。从理论上讲，高回报本应吸引更多投资，由此产生的竞争又会拉低利润。但也许是难以利用无形资产来获利使得理论未能成为现实。另一方面，许多企业不愿投资于无形资产，这可能会限制它们未来的增长空间。寻找成长型股票的投资者将面临有限的选择，而这样凤毛麟角的公司对谁都显而易见，因而其估值会非常高。上世纪70年代初曾有备受追捧的“漂亮50”股票（译注：“nifty fifty”，纽约证券交易所交易的50只备受追捧的大盘股），如今有“漂亮五六”就不错了。
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