Central Banks: Think Bigger

央行：着眼更高处

 

To equip themselves for the next recession, central banks face a delicate task

要准备好应对下一场衰退，各国央行面对一项需要小心拿捏的任务

 

It has been a decade since America’s latest recession, and it has taken that long for the Federal Reserve to ask itself whether it is ready for the next one. On June 4th officials and scholars gathered in Chicago to debate how monetary policy should work in a world of low interest rates. The benchmark rate is 2.25-2.5%, which gives the Fed little room to cut before hitting zero – and less than half as much as it has needed in past downturns. As if to remind policymakers that rock-bottom rates are here to stay, the ten-year Treasury yield fell below 2.3% late last month. Other central banks, many of which preside over still lower rates and weaker economies, are looking to the Fed for inspiration.

 

距美国最近一次经济衰退已过了十年，而美联储也花了同样长的时间自问是否已为下一次衰退做好了准备。6月4日，官员和学者们齐聚芝加哥，讨论货币政策该如何在一个低利率的世界中发挥作用。目前的基准利率在2.25%到2.5%之间，距零利率之近令美联储没有多少降息的空间。而且，这样的数字还不到过去的经济衰退期它所需的利率水平的一半。上月末，十年期国债收益率跌至2.3%以下，似乎在提醒政策制定者低利率的情形还将继续。而其他国家央行治下的利率甚至还要低，经济也更疲软，它们正在向美联储寻求灵感。

 

The belated battle-planning, although welcome, is awkwardly timed. Central banking is becoming more politicised. President Donald Trump has called for the Fed to cut rates and tried unsuccessfully to appoint two of his cronies to its board. Left-wingers are increasingly interested in taking charge of monetary policy. In Britain they have suggested, variously, that the Bank of England should cap house-price growth and target productivity – as if the rate of technological change were a monetary phenomenon. Central banks are often eyed as a source of cash for infrastructure investment or for fighting climate change. The European Central Bank’s quantitative easing (QE), bond-buying with newly created money, is a source of tension between euro-zone countries, helping make the ECB’s leadership race even more political than usual.

 

迟来的战斗计划虽值得欢迎，发生的时间却比较尴尬。央行的角色正变得越来越政治化。特朗普呼吁美联储降息，还试图任命自己的两个亲信加入美联储董事会未果。左翼人士对掌控货币政策的兴趣日渐增长。在英国，他们以各种各样的方式建议英格兰银行限制房价上涨并紧盯生产率——就好像技术变革的速度是一种货币现象似的。央行常被视为基础设施投资或对抗气候变化的资金来源。欧洲央行的量化宽松政策（QE，即通过加印新钞来购买债券）是欧元区国家之间关系紧张的一个源头，令欧洲央行的领袖职位之争变得愈发政治化。

 

Given these pressures, central bankers’ caution should hardly be surprising. They surely fear that overhauling their targets and tools could lead to a free-for-all in which stability and independence give way to populist interference or even economic quackery. But that is not a sufficient reason to hold back. A worse danger is that the world faces a downturn it cannot adequately fight (see United States section). Central banks need to prepare for what is coming, by looking afresh at their targets and their tools, even as they strive to keep their independence.

 

鉴于这些压力，央行官员的谨慎并不叫人意外。他们无疑担心大举修订自己的目标和工具会导致一种所有人都可以参与进来的大混战，原本的稳定和独立让位于民粹主义的干涉甚至经济上的骗人把戏。但这并不是不作为的充分理由。更糟糕的危险是世界正面临一场衰退却无法正确抗击它。各国央行在努力保持自身独立的同时，还需重新审视自己的目标和工具，为即将到来的局面做好准备。

 

Unfortunately, the outcome of the review is likely to be just a tweak to the Fed’s target or its communications policy and a decision not to change to its tools. The Fed may pledge to redefine its inflation goal, of 2%, so that this applies on average over the economic cycle. Overshoots during booms would make up for shortfalls during busts. The theory is that this might help deal with interest rates stuck near zero, by boosting inflation expectations in a downturn. That would mean real rates were lower, giving the economy a boost.

 

遗憾的是，审视的结果可能只是美联储微调了自己的目标或沟通政策，而做出不改变其工具的决定。美联储可能会承诺重新定义其2%的通胀目标，以便它在整个经济周期内都普遍适用。在繁荣时期超出目标应会弥补在萧条期间未达到目标。理论上看，这会在经济低迷时提高通胀预期，这也许有助于应对在零附近徘徊的低利率。这将意味着实际利率会下降，从而推动经济增长。

 

However that is likely to prove too modest. Start with targets. Inflation has undershot the Fed’s target 85% of the time since it was announced in 2012. Financial markets expect these shortfalls to continue for years. Investors may well ignore any new pledges from central bankers to get inflation above the target. And even if they believed the Fed, the cut in real interest rates would be too small to offset a bad bust. In the dark days of 2009 one rule of thumb for monetary policy suggested that nominal interest rates needed to be almost minus 4%.

 

然而，到头来这可能还是太小打小闹了。先来看目标。自2012年美联储宣布2%的目标以来，通胀率在85%的时间都低于这一目标。金融市场预计这种状况还将持续多年。投资者很可能会忽视央行官员声称要使通胀高于目标的任何承诺。而即使他们相信美联储，实际利率下调的幅度也会太小，无法抵消严重经济衰退的影响。根据货币政策的一个经验法则，在2009年的灰暗日子里，当时的名义利率几乎需要降到负4%。

 

The tools are equally in need of an overhaul. Most central banks have three unconventional policies to stimulate depressed economies: QE, forward guidance (trying to talk down bond yields) and negative interest rates. Debate rages over the effectiveness of QE – some see it as little more than forward guidance in disguise. Yet forward guidance is not always credible, whether it is disguised or not. And deeply negative interest rates require reforms to prevent people from hoarding cash or from causing instability at banks, which will struggle to get people to pay them for taking deposits.

 

央行的工具同样需要全面的改革。大多数央行都有三项非常规政策可用于刺激不景气的经济：量化宽松、前瞻指引（试图压低债券收益率）和负利率。围绕量化宽松有效性的争论十分激烈，有些人认为它只不过是披着伪装的前瞻指引。然而，不管是否伪装，前瞻指引并不总是可信。而实施严重的负利率则需要改革来防止人们囤积现金或造成银行不稳定，因为银行将很难让人们为了把钱存在银行而付钱给银行。

 

The federal preserve

联储人的保留地

 

If the reforms are inadequate, the result could be a long and ruinous slump. Avoiding that fate is worth the risks. Central banks should thus swap their inflation targets for something better – we favour a target for nominal GDP, a measure that is more closely tied to the fortunes of debtors and investors – and they should search for new sources of monetary ammunition.

 

如果改革不充分，结果可能就是毁灭性的长期经济滑坡。为了避免这种命运，冒险是值得的。因此，各国央行应该用更好的选择来替换其通胀目标。我们主张采用名义GDP作为目标，这一指标与债务人和投资者的际遇联系得更紧密。此外他们还应寻找新的货币政策弹药的来源。

 

Politicians will inevitably play a part in the choice of such innovations – and rightly so, because they set the framework for the technocrats. What is more, the necessary work will take sustained effort, not a single meeting. The bankers should not be cowed by the threat of politicisation. Their work is too urgent and too important for that.

 

政客们不可避免地将参与到这类创新的选择中，而且他们理当如此，因为他们为技术官僚设定框架。更重要的是，这项必须的工作需要不断为之努力，而不是仅靠一次会议就能一蹴而就。央行官员们不应被政治化的威胁吓倒，因为他们的工作太紧迫也太重要了。

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