Free Exchange: The Problematic Proposal
自由交流：有问题的提议
Shifts in global-trade patterns are fuelling a new anti-trade fervour
全球贸易模式的变迁激起了新一轮反贸易热潮
These are difficult times for America’s free-traders. Donald Trump has put anger at “globalism” at the heart of his campaign. Even Democrats have turned against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – an ambitious new agreement between 12 Pacific-rim countries, and one of Barack Obama’s signature second-term achievements. Hillary Clinton, once a backer, has withdrawn her support, while left-wing activists rail against the deal at every opportunity. The changing structure of global trade is partly to blame for the souring of public opinion. Unfortunately, that evolution will make any new effort to liberalise trade devilishly hard.
现在是美国自由贸易主义者的艰难时刻。唐纳德·特朗普已经将对“全球主义”的愤怒之情作为其竞选的核心。即便是民主党人也转而反对跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）——这一雄心勃勃的新协议由环太平洋的12个国家达成，也是奥巴马第二任期的一项标志性政绩。希拉里曾是该协定的支持者，但也已不再予以支持，而左翼活跃分子更是抓住一切时机痛责这一协定。公共舆论不断恶化，一定程度上是受到全球贸易结构变化的影响。不幸的是，这样的演变会使贸易自由化的任何新努力都变得无比困难。
Trade between America and China has grown explosively since 2000, over which time manufacturing employment in America has fallen from just over 17m workers to around 12m, while wages for less-skilled workers have stagnated. In a recent paper David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson examined the performance of cities where industry was most exposed to Chinese competition. They found depressed wages and labour-force participation and elevated unemployment persisted for a decade or more after rapid growth in trade with China began. Resentment at this experience, and at the perception that too little has been done by American leaders to mitigate these harms, certainly motivates some trade warriors. The wonder, arguably, is that politicians have taken so long to exploit these trends.
自2000年开始，中美贸易迅猛增长，在此期间美国制造业员工从略超过1700万人降至1200万左右，同时低技术工人的工资水平也陷入停滞。在一篇最新的论文中，大卫·奥特尔（David Autor）、大卫·多恩（David Dorn）和高登·汉森（Gordon Hanson）研究了多个城市的表现，这些城市的产业受中国竞争的影响最深。他们发现，对中贸易开始飞速发展之后，低迷的工资和劳动力参与度以及升高的失业率持续了十年甚至更久。对这一经历的愤恨，以及对美国领导人在缓解这些伤害上少有作为的不满，必然激起一些反自由贸易斗士的斗志。可以说，令人讶异的是政治家们竟然过了这么久才来利用这些趋势。
However, polling actually shows that Americans favour freer trade – more so, in fact, than they did a few years ago, when Mr Obama prioritised the TPP negotiations. But the recognition of the value of trade agreements does not extend to acceptance of TPP. Recent surveys find that the majority of Americans are against it. If worker angst and Sinophobia were determining what people think, then you might expect more anger about overall trade but less hostility to TPP, which excludes China. Instead, the public – and even Republicans, now America’s most trade-hostile party – see more opportunity than cost to expanded trade, while at the same time distrusting TPP.
然而民调显示，其实美国人喜欢更加自由的贸易，甚至比几年前奥巴马优先考虑TPP谈判时更喜欢。不过对贸易协定价值的肯定并不意味着对TPP的接受。最新调查显示大部分美国人都反对这一协定。如果工人的焦虑和恐华情绪在决定人们的想法，那么人们应当对整体贸易更为愤慨，而不那么敌视将中国排除在外的TPP才对。但是，公众乃至如今美国最仇视贸易的党派共和党都认为，贸易扩大带来的机遇要多于付出的成本，但同时他们又不相信TPP。
This odd divergence in opinion may be linked to a globalisation of supply chains. Production of traded goods has become “unbundled”, says Richard Baldwin of the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Firms once tended to design new gadgets and order the supplies needed to build them in a single factory or city. In the past few decades, more efficient global shipping and improvements in communications allowed firms to spread production across far-flung locations: to design a phone in America, source parts from several Asian economies, and assemble it in China. The share of parts and components in trade rose from 22% to 29% between 1980 and 2000. In 2005 trade in “intermediate inputs” accounted for an estimated 56% of trade in goods and 73% in services across rich countries. This dispersion of production chains contributed to a dramatic acceleration in global trade growth. It also changed the way many workers view trade. Where once it meant the choice between Japanese and American gadgetry, it now means iPhones, but built with cheap foreign labour.
这一奇怪的意见分歧或许可以和供应链的全球化联系起来。日内瓦国际关系及发展高等学院（The Graduate Institute, Geneva）的理查德·鲍德温（Richard Baldwin）认为贸易货物的生产已呈现“非绑定的”形式。公司曾经倾向于设计新奇物件，并只从一个工厂或城市订购生产所需的物资。在过去几十年里，更高效的全球运输加上通信的进步，让公司能够将生产分布到更广阔的地区：在美国设计手机，从几个亚洲经济体采购零件，然后在中国组装。从1980年到2000年间，零部件在贸易中的比重从22%升至29%。2005年“中间投入”的贸易估计占富裕国家货物贸易的56%、服务贸易的73%。生产链的分散极大地促进了全球贸易的增长，也改变了很多工人对贸易的看法。贸易曾经意味着是选日本还是美国产的小玩意，现在它意味着iPhone手机，但由便宜的外国劳工生产。
As production has spread around the world, countries have specialised in different segments of the supply chain. While those, such as China, with lots of low-cost labour, focused on manufacturing and assembly, more advanced economies followed a different path. Cities like New York and San Francisco enjoyed an initial advantage in the most lucrative bits of the modern supply chain: research and development, engineering and finance. As a result, growth in supply-chain trade has been a boon for the powerful and profitable firms with headquarters in those cities, and for the highly skilled, well-compensated workers they employ. To the extent that further trade integration is seen as likely to reinforce these trends, TPP helps motivate opposition among red-state Republicans who are contemptuous and suspicious of big, blue-state metropolitan areas, and also among left-leaning Americans worried about inequality.
随着生产扩展到全世界，各个国家专精负责供应链的不同环节。像中国这样有大量低成本劳动力的国家专注于制造和组装，而更发达的经济体走的则是不同的道路。纽约和旧金山等城市有着初始优势，处于现代供应链最赚钱的部分：研发、工程和金融。因此，对于总部位于这些城市、既实力强大又获利丰厚的公司，以及它们雇佣的技术娴熟、待遇优厚的雇员来说，供应链贸易的增长已成为一种福利。鉴于更深入的贸易一体化被认为可能会强化这些趋势，TPP不仅会激起红州共和党人的反对——他们蔑视且怀疑广大蓝州的大都市地区，还会激起对不平等状况忧心忡忡的左倾美国人的反对。
Worse still, from a strictly political perspective, is the focus within new trade agreements on stripping away non-tariff barriers. After decades of multinational diplomacy, tariff rates on most goods traded by most members of the WTO are too low to mention. Yet all sorts of obstacles to free exchange remain. Tradable services – in finance, or information industries – are subject to thickets of domestic regulation, for example conditions that must be satisfied before a firm can invest across borders. Simplifying and harmonising such rules should reduce trade costs. But when voters get a peek at such negotiations, they see their government offering to alter domestic standards – to sacrifice autonomy and sell out domestic interests, even – just to help the big firms make a few more bucks. Multinational companies do indeed exercise plenty of influence over what such pacts will entail. Yet even if they did not, the nature of the bargaining would make such dealmaking politically vulnerable.
从严格的政治角度看，更糟糕的是新贸易协定的重点是破除非关税贸易壁垒。在几十年多边外交之后，WTO大部分成员国的大多数货物关税已经低到不值一提，但自由贸易的种种阻碍仍然存在。金融或信息产业可交易的服务受制于错综复杂的国内法规。例如一家公司在跨境投资前必须满足种种条件，简化并且协调这些法规应该可以降低贸易成本。但是选民们只需对这样的谈判稍加了解，便会认为政府提出更改国内标准（甚至牺牲自主权、出卖本国利益）只是为了帮助大公司多赚一些。对于这些协议的细节，跨国公司的确发挥了很大的影响。但是即便它们没有影响，讨价还价的本质也会让这样的交易在政治上易受攻击。
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